Apologies for the length of this, but it's a good summary of the NI situation. Which seems to be the trickiest part to navigate. Highlighted the key bits. Personally I don't think many people I've seen talking about NI understand what's happening. Not even some of the MP's!
Also I don't think the situation regarding the hard border and the GFA is acceptable. It's just kicking the problem we have now down the road so no-one has to muddy their hands with it.
CUSTOMS
Northern Ireland is legally in the UK’s customs territory, but would it would apply the EU’s rules and procedures on tariffs.
Northern Ireland would also be aligned with the rules of the single market for industrial goods and agri-food products, meaning both regulatory and customs checks and controls on the Irish Sea for goods going from Great Britain to Northern Ireland.
However, the extent of the controls would be reduced thanks to a series of tariff exemptions.
There would be an automatic exemption for personal goods and possessions carried by those travelling back and forth between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, or, for example, if an individual was moving house.
However, there would potentially be a broader category of goods and tradable products that could be exempt from tariffs and controls if there was no risk whatsoever of such goods entering EU’s single market across the land border.
These categories of goods would be decided on in the future by the Joint Committee of EU and UK officials by consensus. The Joint Committee was established in the original Withdrawal Agreement as a way for both sides to manage the new arrangements.
The intensity and scope of Irish Sea checks would be limited by a risk-analysis. However, the EU would, through the Joint Committee, have a veto over which kinds of goods would enjoy an exemption from tariffs and controls.
There would also be a system of rebates for goods shipped from Great Britain to Northern Ireland if those goods attracted an EU tariff that was higher than the UK tariff.
CONSENT
The mechanism essentially provides a qualified opt-out of the revised backstop arrangements via the NI Assembly
Northern Ireland would take on the new customs and regulatory regime for four years after the end of the transition period, which is due to conclude at the end of 2020.
At that point Stormont would have to take a view as to whether or not to opt out of the new arrangements
If Stormont voted to opt out, then there would be a two year cooling off period, during which all sides would have to find an alternative way of complying with the Good Friday Agreement and avoiding a hard border.
If at the end of the two years no alternative was found, then the Protocol would lapse, meaning Ireland would be back to a hard border scenario.
However, if the Stormont Assembly were to collapse during that period, then the default would be that the Protocol arrangements would continue to apply (ie, the revised backstop).
But there will be also be important variations on how Stormont votes for a potential exit.
If Stormont decides to use a simple majority vote, which is seen as less favourable to the DUP, then if that vote to opt out does not succeed, then Stormont would vote again four years on an opt out.
However, if Stormont decided to go for a cross-community majority vote, which is seen as more favourable to the DUP, and the vote did not pass, then Stormont would have to wait another eight years before having another opt-out vote.
Complex, convoluted, politically fraught, but does it square the circle? It’s a weighted approach that gives the DUP cover but the opt out might never take effect because if a hard border looms SInn Féin could just collapse the assembly and the default is the revised backstop